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The last several decades have seen growing agreement among political 
theorists and empirical political scientists that the legitimacy of a democ-
racy depends in part on the quality of deliberation that informs citizens 
and their representatives. Until recently, those who wanted to study and 
improve the quality of deliberation in democracies began with, basically, 
two strategies. One concentrated on deliberation in legislative bodies of all 
sorts and the campaigns that produce their members. The other strategy, 
not necessarily at odds with the first, addressed the design, promulgation, 
and empowerment of small deliberative initiatives in which citizens could 
deliberate under relatively favourable conditions.
Both of these strategies, however, focused only on individual sites and 
not on the interdependence of sites within a larger system. Typically, the 
ideal has been cast in the image of the best possible single deliberative 
forum. Most empirical research on deliberative democracy, accordingly, 
has concentrated ‘either on a single episode of deliberation, as in one-time 
group discussions, or on a continuing series with the same group or in 
the same type of institution’ (Thompson 2008a: 213). Yet no single forum, 
however ideally constituted, could possess deliberative capacity sufficient 
to legitimate most of the decisions and policies that democracies adopt. To 
This introduction was written in a process of deliberative co-authorship led by Jane 
Mansbridge, who prepared the first draft from multiple contributions and oversaw the 
many revisions. Although each co-author, if writing independently, would no doubt pre-
sent the arguments and analyses somewhat differently, the chapter represents a direction 
of thought to which each co-author has substantially contributed and which all collectively 
endorse.
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understand the larger goal of deliberation, we suggest that it is necessary 
to go beyond the study of individual institutions and processes to exam-
ine their interaction in the system as a whole. We recognize that most 
democracies are complex entities in which a wide variety of institutions, 
associations, and sites of contestation accomplish political work – includ-
ing informal networks, the media, organized advocacy groups, schools, 
foundations, private and non-profit institutions, legislatures, executive 
agencies, and the courts. We thus advocate what may be called a systemic 
approach to deliberative democracy.1
Thinking in terms of a system offers several advantages. First, a systemic 
approach allows us to think about deliberative democracy in large-scale 
societal terms. A continual challenge for deliberative democracy theory 
has been the problem of scale. Face-to-face deliberation happens only in 
small groups. Parliamentary deliberation is confined to those forms of 
deliberation organized by states or subnational units. In what sense can 
we say that whole societies, demoi, peoples, or even different communities 
deliberate together? A systemic approach allows us to think productively 
and creatively about this question. It expands the scale of analysis beyond 
the individual site and allows us to think about deliberations that develop 
among and between the sites over time.
The systemic approach does not dictate that we take a nation or large 
polity as our object of study. Schools and universities, hospitals, media, 
and other organizations can be understood along the lines offered by a 
deliberative system approach. But in allowing for the possibility of ratch-
eting up the scale and complexity of interrelations among the parts, this 
approach enables us to think about democratic decisions being taken in 
the context of a variety of deliberative venues and institutions, interacting 
together to produce a healthy deliberative system.
Second, a systemic approach allows us to analyse the division of labour 
among parts of a system, each with its different deliberative strengths and 
1 Habermas suggested a broad approach, compatible with a systemic one, in his earlier 
writing. In (1996) he advanced a ‘two-track’ view combining a relatively ‘wild’ sphere of 
deliberation among ‘weak’ publics with more formal legislative deliberation. For a recent 
view, see Habermas (2006). On deliberative systems, see Mansbridge (1999) introducing 
the term and concept of a ‘deliberative system’, Goodin (2005) on ‘distributed deliber-
ation’, Parkinson (2006a) on ‘legitimacy across multiple deliberative moments and the 
wider deliberative system’, Hendriks (2006a) on an ‘integrated deliberative system’, 
Bohman (2007) on ‘institutional differentiation’ with ‘multiple and intersecting proc-
esses of public deliberation’, Krause (2008) on the ‘different types of constraint on delib-
eration in each domain’, Thompson (2008a) on the ‘allocation of deliberation’, Dryzek 
(2009) on ‘deliberative capacity’ in the system, on the ‘systemic turn’ in deliberative the-
ory (in a book [2010a] largely on the deliberative system), and Neblo (2010) on elements 
of a deliberative system working together to ‘serve the larger deliberative standard’.
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weaknesses, and to conclude that a single part, which in itself may have 
low or even negative deliberative quality with respect to one of several 
deliberative ideals, may nevertheless make an important contribution to 
an overall deliberative system. For example, highly partisan rhetoric, even 
while violating some deliberative ideals such as mutual respect and accom-
modation, may nonetheless help to fulfil other deliberative ideals such as 
inclusion. In another example, serious discussions on European Union 
(EU)-wide matters take place mostly among elites, while the national media 
and, to a lesser degree, national politicians, organize the public debate on 
EU issues. Although the overall system is far from ideal epistemically, the 
elite discourse provides expertise, reasoned and informed mutual accom-
modation, and mutual respect, while the nationally instigated deliberation 
provides perspectives that might otherwise not be heard. By enhancing 
inclusion, the national media also increase the EU’s normative democratic 
legitimacy.
Parts of a system may have relationships of complementarity or dis-
placement. In a complementary relationship, two wrongs can make a 
right. Two venues, both with deliberative deficiencies, can each make up 
for the deficiencies of the other. Thus an institution that looks delibera-
tively defective when considered only on its own can look beneficial in a 
systemic perspective. Conversely, an institution that looks deliberatively 
exemplary on its own, such as a well-designed minipublic, can look less 
beneficial in a systemic perspective when it displaces other useful delibera-
tive institutions, such as partisan or social movement bodies. In another 
instance of displacement, legislatures are less likely to take their delibera-
tive responsibilities seriously when a constitutional court is treated as the 
primary deliberative forum (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 45–7; see also 
Dryzek 2010a: 13).
Third, a systemic approach introduces into the analysis large contextual 
issues and broad systemic inadequacies that have an impact on individual 
sites and shape the possibilities of effective deliberation. Once we identify 
what a deliberative system should accomplish, we can identify gaps in a 
system’s deliberative quality. For example, a deliberative system may fail 
to include in a policy deliberation individuals with legitimate claims for 
inclusion, owing to legal exclusion or to deficiencies of education, informa-
tion, or transparency. Or a system may rely excessively on parliamentary 
processes that frame debate but fail to make space for deliberation, lead-
ing to decisions of relatively poor quality. Even if a legislature has a high 
quality and well informed debate about, for example, reducing the deficit, 
the deliberation looks less adequate in the context of a system that permits 
highly unequal campaign contributions or enables the media to frame the 
issue by highlighting the dangers of deficits with little mention of the harm 
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that cuts would do to the least advantaged citizens in society or to fiscal 
stimuli aimed at stemming recession. A systemic approach allows us to see 
more clearly where a system might be improved, and recommend institu-
tions or other innovations that could supplement the system in areas of 
weakness.
In the next section we lay out, in general and programmatic terms, 
what a systemic approach to deliberation entails, and discuss in more 
detail the benefits of this approach. While we may at times favour certain 
directions and theoretical orientations over others, we want to stress that 
the approach we outline could be taken up by any number of theories of 
deliberative democracy. Like any useful paradigm, deliberative democracy 
theory contains many theoretical variations, competing articulations, and 
contested definitions. Our aim is to articulate an over-arching approach 
to deliberation that could signal a new and we think exciting direction for 
deliberative theory, but which is not itself a free-standing theory of delib-
erative democracy.
We take up in a separate section three elements of a democratic system 
that are usually not considered part of the exercise of deliberative democ-
racy, and reconsider their place in terms of the system. We evaluate experts, 
pressure, and protest, and the partisan media, asking whether they do or 
could enhance the quality of deliberation in the system. We present these 
three only as examples of the sorts of directions a full systemic approach 
to deliberative democracy might take. Nevertheless we think that they 
represent central elements in almost any deliberative democratic system. 
They illustrate particularly well the advantages of a systemic approach, 
because all three are often assumed to be incompatible with deliberative 
democracy and do in fact create tensions with it. In a final section we 
identify five potential pathologies that threaten any deliberative system. 
Although some of these pathologies have their analogues at the level of 
individual sites, they are fundamentally problems inherent in a system and 
most clearly discerned through a broad systemic approach.
What is a deliberative system?
A system here means a set of distinguishable, differentiated, but to some 
degree interdependent parts, often with distributed functions and a div-
ision of labour, connected in such a way as to form a complex whole. It 
requires both differentiation and integration among the parts. It requires 
some functional division of labour, so that some parts do work that others 
cannot do as well. And it requires some relational interdependence, so 
that a change in one component will bring about changes in some others. 
A deliberative system is one that encompasses a talk-based approach to 
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political conflict and problem-solving – through arguing, demonstrat-
ing, expressing, and persuading. In a good deliberative system, persuasion 
that raises relevant considerations should replace suppression, oppression, 
and thoughtless neglect. Normatively, a systemic approach means that the 
system should be judged as a whole in addition to the parts being judged 
independently. We need to ask not only what good deliberation would be 
both in general and in particular settings, but also what a good deliberative 
system would entail.
A systemic approach, in our view, does not require that every compo-
nent have a function or that every component be interdependent with 
every other such that a change in one will automatically bring about a 
change in all others. If a component does contribute to a function, it is not 
necessary that the function be fulfilled optimally in one location, since in 
a deliberative system the same function may be distributed across various 
subsystems. The concept as we apply it is not intended to be mechanistic; 
nor do we require a system to have clearly identifiable boundaries. Our 
point is that normatively, in the systemic approach the entire burden of 
decision making and legitimacy does not fall on one forum or institution 
but is distributed among different components in different cases.
We expect that a highly functional deliberative system will be redun-
dant or potentially redundant in interaction, so that when one part fails 
to play an important role another can fill in or evolve over time to fill in. 
Such a system will include checks and balances of various forms so that 
excesses in one part are checked by the activation of other parts of the 
system. We also envision systems that are dynamic rather than static. Thus 
it may be hard to predict in advance when or why some parts of the system 
will respond to certain forms of public opinion or represent certain inter-
ests and publics or certain kinds of values and procedures.
It should not be surprising that a political system requires a division 
of labour. Political judgments are complex, and the system in which they 
are made should also be complex. Because political judgments involve so 
many factual contingencies and competing normative requirements, and 
because politics involves the alignments of will, both in concert and in 
opposition, among large numbers of citizens, it is virtually impossible to 
conceive of a political system that does not divide the labours of judgment 
and then recombine them in various ways. The concept of a system high-
lights these necessities.
To take an example of the systemic approach applied to a concrete policy 
deliberation, John Parkinson (2006a) has analysed a series of UK initia-
tives that promoted deliberative public involvement in health policy mak-
ing, including through citizens’ juries – small groups of citizens chosen 
relatively randomly and convened to deliberate on the issue. As he points 
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out, health care is ‘a tough testing ground of the ability of any deliberative 
process to handle legitimacy deficits’ (2006a: 44). He shows that under-
standing the deliberative process in the UK on this issue requires look-
ing beyond the particular deliberative site of citizens’ juries to a complex 
deliberative system with many participants – including health service pro-
fessionals with their unions, activists, administrators, charity groups, and 
more – each with their own agendas and points of view. The processes cut 
across levels of government, from the local and regional to the national. 
Parkinson shows that it matters a great deal which groups commission 
forms of ‘micro-deliberation’ like citizens’ juries and how they construct 
the procedures. It also matters at what level of the policy hierarchy such 
micro-deliberative procedures are used. These procedures ‘tend to be used 
lower down in the hierarchy’ because the lower echelons have greater legit-
imation needs and feel stronger pressures to be responsive (2006a: 64). A 
systems analysis allows us to see how on this issue the citizens’ juries can 
themselves score relatively high on deliberative standards and at the same 
time have both negative and positive systemic effects. On the negative side, 
they to some degree displaced and weakened the existing advocacy organi-
zations, thus reducing the impact of these groups on societal deliberation. 
On the more positive side, they served as a stimulating ‘focal point’ (2006a: 
177) for organizing societal deliberation. A deliberative system approach 
thus takes into account not only a particular forum or innovation but 
also the role of that forum or innovation in the larger deliberative system, 
allowing us to gauge its democratic weaknesses and strengths within the 
larger dynamic of groups and levels.
A deliberative systemic approach also suggests looking for ‘deliberative 
ecologies’, in which different contexts facilitate some forms of deliberation 
and avenues for information while others facilitate different forms and 
avenues. Partisanship and information heuristics or short cuts are usually 
contrasted with deliberation and seen as among the most serious obsta-
cles to good quality deliberation. But a deliberative systemic approach asks 
when and where there is an appropriate ecological niche for partisan cam-
paigns and heuristics. Because legislators and citizens in their busy lives 
will tend to rely on partisan organization and heuristics to guide their deci-
sions, a good deliberative system will draw from the virtues of these indi-
vidually deliberatively deficient devices but guard in various ways against 
their vices. Sometimes associations that are internally non-deliberative 
and homogeneous will, for that very reason, be able to assert a coherent 
public position and sharpen a public debate. Sometimes particular stages 
or sequences in a political process will embody a useful division of labour, 
with relatively open deliberations at the beginning narrowing to a focus as 
the point of decision is reached. Sometimes arguments made in one part of 
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the system will be tested in another part. Such mechanisms enable a good 
deliberative system to be self-correcting.
Here are three examples of how partisanship may appear to undermine 
deliberation at a micro level but not at a systems level:
The British House of Commons engages in partisan heckling that •	
violates many standards of good deliberation. Yet that very culture 
of heckling provides incentives to poke holes in the reasoning of a 
Government that otherwise makes all the major decisions and rules 
by strict and overriding majority. It may also function to frame and 
sharpen broader public deliberations.
Some politically partisan media are of very low deliberative quality, •	
but in conjunction with other media of equally low deliberative qual-
ity bring out information and perspectives that television stations or 
newspapers aiming at the middle of the road do not raise or address.
Activist interactions in social movement enclaves are often highly •	
partisan, closed to opposing ideas, and disrespectful of opponents. 
Yet the intensity of interaction and even the exclusion of opposing 
ideas in such enclaves create the fertile, protected hothouses some-
times necessary to generate counter-hegemonic ideas. These ideas 
then may play powerful roles in the broader deliberative system, sub-
stantively improving an eventual democratic decision.
A systemic approach can also illuminate how partisanship that is func-
tional in one part of the system becomes dysfunctional when it spreads to 
another part of the system that requires other virtues. For example, the 
attitudes and practices of campaigning – emphasizing the sharp differ-
ences with opponents, refusing to find common ground or look for ways 
to compromise, and concentrating on defeating rather than cooperating 
with opponents – are not deliberative but may be appropriate, even neces-
sary, in a campaign. Yet as campaigns become ‘permanent’ and their prac-
tices come to dominate the institutions of governing, they can overpower 
the deliberative practices that promote desirable change, thus creating a 
bias in the system in favour of the status quo (Gutmann and Thompson 
2010).
To clarify the systemic approach for democracies, we need to consider 
the boundaries of the system, the functions within the system, and the 
standards by which the system should be evaluated.
Boundaries of the system
What are the boundaries of a deliberative system? In our current analysis, 
these boundaries define a decision-making arena that is at least loosely 
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democratic. It is of course possible to think about a deliberative system 
independently of democracy. Authoritarian regimes have deliberation. 
Much deliberation goes on within the Catholic Church. Scientific com-
munities could perhaps be said to have deliberative systems. But because 
we focus here on deliberative democratic systems, we begin with sys-
tems that are broadly defined by the norms, practices, and institutions of 
democracy.
As a first cut, we adopt here an institutional approach in which the delib-
erative system is conceptualized and evaluated as it functions within the 
boundaries of nation states, supranational states, international decision-
making bodies, and the international institutions with which the nation 
states and supranational states are linked. Our analysis applies to all gov-
ernmental and non-governmental institutions, including governance 
networks and the informal friendship networks that link individuals and 
groups discursively on matters of common concern.
One can define the boundaries of a deliberative system either institu-
tionally or by reference to a particular issue. Both demarcations, however, 
include societal decisions. This important dimension added by the systemic 
approach has often been excluded from deliberative analysis. Informal dis-
cussion can contribute to an eventual state decision and to broad societal 
decisions, such as the decision not to settle a particular matter through the 
state. Such societal decisions in our understanding are emergent rather 
than definite. They are binding only in a loose social sense. As decisions 
by accretion (Mansbridge 1986), they have no clear-cut point at which an 
observer can say that a decision has been taken. Yet when the majority of 
a society or a subgroup changes its norms and practices, bringing to bear 
social sanctions on those who deviate from the new norms and practices, 
it seems fair to say that in a general way that majority has taken a decision, 
especially when the change has been accompanied by extensive discussion 
of the pros and cons of such a change. Thus the widespread societal con-
clusion that discrimination in hiring by race and gender is unjust is rea-
sonably described as a collective decision, resulting in part from certain 
binding state decisions but also in large part from hundreds or millions 
of individual and institutional decisions based on widespread collective 
discussion and interaction. The lack of a clear decisional point in such 
emergent decisions provides one more reason why looking only at a part 
of a system can cause one to miss significant phenomena that affect delib-
eration. New emergent discourses change over time the way that people 
conceptualize problems – from explicit social agreements not to engage 
genital cutting in Africa (Mackie forthcoming) to accepting the idea of 
sustainable development. We conceive of such discursive interactions as 
part of the deliberative system.
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Other decisions with significant societal effects, for example by corpo-
rations to end sweatshop conditions, are not necessarily binding in the 
legal sense but when they derive from or affect the arguments surfaced 
in broad societal deliberation, they are part of the deliberative system. 
Sometimes exclusion from the state generates a livelier discourse, as when 
environmental activists, excluded from the neo-corporatist German state 
from the late 1960s to the mid 1980s, generated some of the most profound 
green critiques of political economy at a distance from the state (Dryzek 
et al. 2003; see also Dryzek 2010a: 170–6). Including societal discussions 
and emergent decisions in a deliberative system does not, however, mean 
including all talk. Our criteria for inclusion in a deliberative system are 
that the discussions in question involve matters of common concern and 
have a practical orientation. By a practical orientation we mean the discus-
sion is not purely theoretical but involves an element of the question ‘what 
is to be done?’.
Deliberative systems include, roughly speaking, four main arenas: the 
binding decisions of the state (both in the law itself and its implementa-
tion); activities directly related to preparing for those binding decisions; 
informal talk related to those binding decisions;2 and arenas of formal or 
informal talk related to decisions on issues of common concern that are 
not intended for binding decisions by the state.3
When Jürgen Habermas (1996) employed the spatial metaphor of 
centre/periphery – the centre being the place of binding decisions (will-
formation) and the periphery being the place of less formal deliberation 
(opinion-formation) – his deliberative system took the modern nation state 
as its subject and made the legislature its centre. Many subsequent scholars 
have done the same, conceiving of the deliberative system as ‘rings’ around 
the state.4 By contrast, our understanding of deliberative systems includes 
both informal decisions by accretion and binding decisions that take place 
outside the state. It goes beyond the boundaries of the nation state to 
include international, transnational, and supranational institutions, and 
extends as well to societal and institutional (e.g. corporate) decisions that 
do not involve the state. We take the state and its legislatures as the ultim-
ate decision-makers in a polity, but not as the centre to which everything 
2 This kind of talk is often described as informal ‘political’ talk (Searing et al. 2007), talk 
about ‘politics’ (Neblo 2010), talk about ‘public issues’ (Chambers, Chapter 3 in this vol-
ume; Jacobs et al. 2009), or ‘private talk that is recognizably political’ (Parkinson, Chapter 
7, this volume), our emphases.
3 The definition of ‘common concern’ in these non-state arenas is contested. Mansbridge 
(1999) defined it as encompassing ‘issues the public ought to discuss’, thus making the 
contest at its heart explicit.
4 E.g. Searing (2007), Hendriks (2006a), and to some degree Neblo (2010).
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is aimed in the polity’s deliberative system. It is true that, to the degree 
that any given constitution and set of international agreements permit, the 
state can in theory make binding decisions in all issue areas. We also rec-
ognize the state’s central role in solving human collective action problems 
by making and implementing binding decisions with a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence. Moreover, the state has a unique role to play in 
constituting deliberative systems. Liberal-democratic constitutional states 
create spaces of deliberation within political institutions such as legisla-
tures and courts. They also enable deliberation within society by protecting 
free speech and association. They encourage deliberation by underwriting 
institutions in which deliberation is itself constitutive, such as universities 
and scientific research establishments. But even though states play a cen-
tral and often constitutive role in deliberative systems, not all efficacious 
and important parts in the system lead to the state. The state is not the 
terminus of all deliberation. For example, our institutional demarcation 
of the deliberative system includes societal decisions, many of which have 
only a very indirect impact on state legislation.
A map of nodes in the deliberative system would reveal many nodes, 
with multiple forms of communication among them. Those nodes would 
include nation state bodies at different levels of government and with their 
different legislative houses, administrative agencies, the military, and the 
staffs of all of these, international bodies at different levels and their staffs, 
multinational corporations and local businesses, epistemic communities, 
foundations, political parties and factions within those parties, party cam-
paigns and other partisan forums, religious bodies, schools, universities 
with their departments, fields, and disciplinary associations, unions, inter-
est groups, voluntary associations and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) both ad hoc and longstanding, social movements with both their 
enclaves and their broader participation, the media including the Internet, 
blogs, social media, interactive media, books, magazines, newspapers, 
film, and television, informal talk among politically active or less active 
individuals whether powerful or marginalized, and forms of subjugated 
and local knowledge that rarely surface for access by others without some 
opening in the deliberative system.
Functions of the deliberative system
In the systemic approach, we assess institutions according to how well 
they perform the functions necessary to promote the goals of the system. 
Theorists disagree about the goals of deliberation within a democracy, and 
thus they may not agree about the most important functions of a deliberative 
system. However, we believe that the system approach can accommodate a 
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variety of functions and goals, and its value does not depend on resolving 
these disagreements. For our purposes, three functions that are relatively 
non-controversial in their most general articulation can serve to illustrate 
how a system approach can be applied. We identify epistemic, ethical, and 
democratic functions.
The epistemic function of a deliberative system is to produce prefer-
ences, opinions, and decisions that are appropriately informed by facts and 
logic and are the outcome of substantive and meaningful consideration of 
relevant reasons. A healthy deliberative system is one in which relevant 
considerations are brought forth from all corners, aired, discussed, and 
appropriately weighed. Locations in which this weighing occurs may or 
may not manifest publicity, although the absence of publicity often limits 
deliberative capacity. Because the topics of these deliberations are issues of 
common concern, epistemically well-grounded preferences, opinions, and 
decisions must be informed by, and take into consideration, the prefer-
ences and opinions of fellow citizens.
In addition to the epistemic reasons for listening to what others have 
to say, there are also ethical reasons. A primary ethical function of the 
system is to promote mutual respect among citizens. Prudentially, mutual 
respect helps keep the deliberative system running. It serves as the lubri-
cant of effective communication. Ethically, mutual respect among human 
beings is a good in itself. Mutual respect is also an ethical requirement 
among democratic citizens. The moral basis for mutual respect in dem-
ocracy is grounded on the idea that citizens should be treated ‘not merely 
as objects of legislation, as passive subjects to be ruled, but as autonomous 
agents who take part in the governance of their society, directly or through 
their representatives’ (Gutmann and Thompson 2004).
This moral basis is not controversial, although how mutual respect 
should be interpreted in practice may be. It is more contestable than the 
epistemic function of simply improving informational quality and learn-
ing about others’ preferences, opinions, and decisions. Theorists and citi-
zens alike disagree about what mutual respect means, what constitutes 
its successful achievement and how weighty it is compared with other 
considerations. We stress mutual respect, however, because, even more 
than other ethical considerations, it is intrinsically a part of deliberation. 
To deliberate with another is to understand the other as a self-authoring 
source of reasons and claims. To fail to grant to another the moral status 
of authorship is, in effect, to remove oneself from the possibility of delib-
erative influence. By the same token, being open to being moved by the 
words of another is to respect the other as a source of reasons, claims, and 
perspectives. Other goods are closely linked with mutual respect. Mutual 
respect, for example, implies non-domination, because relationships of 
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domination have already short-circuited mutual respect and, with this, 
deliberative influence.
A final function of deliberation, not completely separable from the first 
two, is to promote an inclusive political process on terms of equality. We 
call this the democratic function. The inclusion of multiple and plural 
voices, interests, concerns, and claims on the basis of feasible equality is 
not simply an ethic added to democratic deliberation; it is the central elem-
ent of what makes deliberative democratic processes democratic. Who gets 
to be at the table affects the scope and content of the deliberation. For those 
excluded, no deliberative democratic legitimacy is generated. In short, a 
well-functioning democratic deliberative system must not systematically 
exclude any citizens from the process without strong justification that 
could be reasonably accepted by all citizens, including the excluded. On 
the positive side, it ought also actively to promote and facilitate inclusion 
and the equal opportunities to participate in the system.5
The successful realization of all three of these functions promotes the 
legitimacy of democratic decision-making by ensuring reasonably sound 
decisions in the context of mutual respect among citizens and an inclusive 
process of collective choice. Legitimacy in this strong sense maximizes the 
chances that people who share a common fate will agree, willingly, to the 
terms of their common cooperation. Of course, these different functions 
can come into conflict within any democratically deliberative system. 
There will be controversy over about their relative weights. Some delibera-
tive democrats will assign, for example, much higher priority to mutual 
respect than to the aim of producing epistemically sound decisions.
Normatively, we endorse all three overarching functions, recognizing 
their potential conflicts and expecting that many conflicts will have to 
be worked out through deliberation on a provisional basis in any given 
context. A systemic approach allows for a nuanced application of these 
functions, recognizing that some will be more important than others in 
different parts of the system.
As our preceding discussion and some of our cases below illustrate, a 
systemic approach complicates the question of standards. What might 
be considered low quality or undemocratic deliberation in an individ-
ual instance might from a systems perspective contribute to an over-
all healthy deliberation. For example, not every group that participates 
in the democratic deliberation of the whole society need be internally 
fully democratic. The purposes of institutions and their functions in 
collective decisions will often dictate differing internal constraints on 
5 See Goodin (2007). Including affected interests may involve formal representation and 
new political rights (Bohman, Chapter 4, this volume).
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deliberation, such as instructions to juries about rules of evidence, 
blind peer review, limitations on amendments to a bill that has gone 
through its final reading, or closed-door negotiations on sensitive mat-
ters. Judging the quality of the whole system on the basis of the func-
tions and goals one specifies for the system does not require that those 
functions be fully realized in all the parts. This two-tier approach to 
evaluation will become clearer as we move through three examples of a 
systemic analysis of deliberation.
Many practitioners in the field of deliberative democracy are in the pro-
cess of examining the conditions that promote or impede the perform-
ance of these epistemic, ethical and inclusive functions, at the same time 
that theorists are investigating the appropriate standards for deliberation 
that promote these functions.6 On the most abstract level, we argue sim-
ply that high quality deliberation promotes these functions effectively; 
low quality deliberation fails to do so as effectively. The question becomes 
more complex when we try to specify the conditions more concretely. For 
example, we might agree that sound epistemic grounding for decisions is 
one important function of the deliberative system but disagree about what 
conditions of deliberation produce epistemically sound decisions. Therefore 
in addition to the three larger functions we would also need a template to 
evaluate the conditions that support the various functions of good delib-
eration. This is, however, not a project that we will take up here. We turn 
instead to three examples that illustrate the deliberative approach.
Three systemic analyses
Experts
Any democratic system – indeed any decision-making entity of even the 
slightest complexity – must rely on experts at all levels within the sys-
tem. Even a highly participatory workplace of only forty people, in which 
members spend as much as a seventh of their time in collective decision-
 making, relies on a division of labour in which some members of the col-
lective develop expertise on which the others depend. In democracies of 
any size, however, controversy arises over where and when experts are 
appropriate and how expert deliberations can be connected to final policy 
decisions or the polity’s more general direction. Only a systemic approach 
to deliberation can make this question tractable.
6 See Mansbridge et al. (2010) on the evolution from ‘classic’ standards of deliberation to 
more contemporary ones.
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A deliberative systemic approach allows us to appreciate the division of 
labour within which experts operate and, for problems that arise, devise 
remedies that draw upon the many different stages and loci in the full 
deliberative process. We can then judge sequences of stages and loci on 
their systemic capacity to draw from the rewards of expertise while redu-
cing the potential deliberative costs of bias, disrespect and non-inclusion. 
The following analysis looks at these costs, each linked to one of the func-
tions of a deliberative democratic system, then suggests systemic ways to 
reduce those costs.
Epistemically, delegation to experts can promote citizen ignorance, with 
highly negative consequences for the deliberative system as a whole. In 
addition, experts themselves can be biased. The world in which they com-
municate can be deeply self-referential. Policy experts may orient them-
selves primarily towards their professional discipline, following technically 
attractive models that once put into practice produce detrimental results 
for the polity. Subtle or crass self-interest, whether in the academic or pri-
vate sector, can affect their conceptions of or policy recommendations 
for the public good. Their own experience may be far narrower than they 
realize. Experts are particularly likely to ignore the experience of margin-
alized groups. In 1955, Cook County Hospital had to decide whether to 
expand its central facility or build a second facility in another area. The 
hospital’s deliberative process involved experts on issues that ranged from 
parking to the costs and benefits of gathering advanced medical equip-
ment in one place versus siting in proximity to underserved populations 
through a second branch. Based on extensive expert deliberation, the hos-
pital decided to build a second branch. That decision, however, met with 
significant opposition from spokesmen for the Chicago African American 
community, because creating a branch of the racially integrated public 
hospital in the chosen area would undermine a proposed campaign to 
force private hospitals in that area to integrate. The experts had never even 
considered this issue (Banfield 1961).
Delegation to experts threatens the ethical function when it produces 
expert disrespect for citizen contributions and even for citizens themselves 
as a result of the sheer complexity and importance of some policy decisions. 
Particularly when faced with life and death decisions, experts sometimes 
need deliberative protection from the ignorance, emotional volatility, and 
myopia of the non-expert. Yet that protection can generate deliberative 
disdain among the experts, which then provokes a reciprocal disdain of 
experts on the part of citizens.
The democratic problem of inclusion in expert rule is simply that the 
exclusion of non-experts from decisions threatens the foundation of dem-
ocracy itself as rule by the people. Even when the people set the ends while 
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the experts in theory address only the means (Christiano, Chapter 2), the 
process of discussing, experimenting with, and implementing the means 
often clarifies and poses new problems for the ends. Excluding non-experts 
from the processes of deliberating over the means undermines the public’s 
goal-setting role in a democracy.
A systemic approach to deliberation can help by stepping back from 
any individual instance of deliberation in which non-experts are excluded 
to evaluate the place of that individual instance in the larger deliberative 
system. The standard approach to the problem of experts looks primarily 
at the legitimacy of the delegation and the relation of the final decision 
to citizen preferences. A systemic approach also looks at the division of 
labour in deliberation, at deliberative stages and forms of recursive and 
redundant non-expert input, at processes designed to surface the know-
ledge of disadvantaged and subordinate groups, at participatory innova-
tions designed to make citizens into experts, and at the role of many forms 
of trusted proxies. Expertise within a system need not be constructed as a 
hierarchy: in some circumstances citizens can divide and distribute their 
labours, so that many contribute their expertise to common decisions 
at differing points in decision processes. In other circumstances, when 
otherwise competent experts are not adept at explaining the reasons for 
their decisions to non-experts, the system as a whole requires some agents 
with the capacity to translate expert conclusions into recommendations 
that citizens can understand.
A systemic approach also draws attention to the way that expert author-
ity is itself often conditionally earned through deliberative means and 
within specialized deliberative communities. Thus experts are often sub-
ject to deliberative accountability through networks of their peers (Goodin 
2003a). In such circumstances we may trust experts because we can ask 
them to explain and to justify their advice or decisions, if not to us directly 
then to a group of their peers who in turn have earned their credentials 
in a deliberatively trustworthy manner. Yet the entire peer network may 
itself be biased. In a good deliberative system, expert authority must be 
deliberatively generated and evaluated with safeguards against systemic 
bias (Warren 1996).
Deliberative stages include the selection of experts and the appropri-
ate delegation of authority to them, the expert deliberation itself, and the 
processes of retrospective analysis and consent. Improvements in expert–
citizen deliberative interaction can come in any of these stages. The discon-
nect between citizens and experts can be bridged by improving the efficacy 
of multiple chains of intelligibility in which ‘translators’ make sense of 
expert considerations for citizens and vice versa (Christiano, Chapter 2). 
Partisan adversary processes can provide a form of trusted proxy when 
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citizens can rightly trust political parties through reputation and parties 
both select their own experts and hold them accountable.7
Participatory innovations allow citizens to develop their own expertise 
and provide channels through which the citizens’ own expertise can influ-
ence policy (Smith 2009). For example, as the primary group that collects 
wood, Nepalese rural women have expertise in identifying disturbed loca-
tions in the forest. When new participatory political practices allow these 
women to add their expertise more directly to the deliberative system that 
produces policy decisions, they help correct the errors that professional 
experts make in understanding local forestry practices and possibilities 
(Agarwal 2010).
In an important recent development, democratic polities have begun to 
create new forms of trusted proxy by inserting in the deliberative system 
relatively randomly selected citizen bodies in which the citizens themselves 
become experts in an issue and then serve as trusted proxies to other citizens 
(MacKenzie and Warren, Chapter 5). Robert Dahl (1970) once suggested 
a third house of the US congress made up of randomly selected citizens, 
based on the ancient Athenian model of the lot, precisely in order to pro-
vide greater citizen input into complex decisions that required more expert-
ise than citizens could usually acquire. Dahl did not expect his third house 
actually to be created. But now, forty years later, we are seeing a prolifer-
ation of groups, ranging in size from six to several hundred, that look much 
like Dahl’s model. They are typically selected through nearly random proc-
esses, and provided the time and resources to develop greater expertise on 
an issue They can then provide to their fellow citizens a more expert, delib-
erated, and informed version of what other citizens might think if they too 
became more expert on the issue. The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly 
is perhaps the most well known of such groups (Warren and Pearse 2008). 
This relatively randomly selected body of citizens was charged with choos-
ing an electoral system for the province that would then be put before the 
citizenry as a whole in a referendum. The Citizens’ Assembly required that 
its citizen members become informal experts on electoral systems over the 
many weekends that it met in the course of a year. Some provisions in estab-
lishing that assembly, such as its screen against members with material or 
pressure-group interests in the issue, its balanced materials, and its non-
partisan sponsorship, increased citizen trust in this relatively expert proxy 
group and gave citizens a second-order reason to trust its conclusions when 
the first-order reasons for and against the different choices required expert-
ise beyond the grasp of most citizens.
7 On the deliberative functions of parties, see White and Ypi (2011).
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Certainly, the introduction of such bodies may have other systemic 
effects. Inserting the Citizens’ Assembly into the British Columbia delib-
eration on electoral processes destabilized the previous deliberative dom-
inance of the political parties, including the Green Party, which had made 
a particular electoral reform (not chosen by the Citizens’ Assembly) one 
of the major planks in its political platform. A similar partial displace-
ment of existing advocacy groups occurred, as mentioned earlier, when 
the British government introduced randomized deliberative forums into 
the health service debate (Parkinson 2006a). Any introduction of rand-
omized deliberative entities, such as citizen juries or deliberative polls, 
into a deliberative system has the potential for undermining an existing 
equilibrium by creating new citizen ‘experts’ and trusted proxies, and thus 
disadvantaging political parties and advocacy groups that had previously 
invested considerable political and social capital in creating deliberative 
trust (Papadopoulos, Chapter 6). Sometimes this displacement is exactly 
what the system as a whole needs; sometimes it can undermine the epi-
stemic, ethical, and democratic functions of the whole.
Political parties and interest group associations can also make experts to 
some extent accountable to ordinary citizens by embedding the experts in 
larger groups whose members share common aims. Experts on the political 
Right contest the knowledge of experts on the political Left and vice versa. 
NGOs develop their own expertise and act as intermediaries between parti-
san and unaffiliated experts and citizens. NGOs can also create channels of 
input from citizens to experts on the nature of the problems to be solved.
These different ways of connecting experts with citizens can improve 
the deliberative system in its epistemic function by bringing in more – and 
more diverse – knowledge, in its ethical function by reducing the lack of 
respect between experts and citizens, and in its democratic function by 
including the perspectives and interests of more citizens. They thereby 
serve to promote the normative legitimacy of the system overall.
Pressure and protest
Jürgen Habermas famously described deliberation as ideally containing 
only the ‘forceless force of the better argument’ (Habermas 1975: 108). 
Very generally, most conceptions of deliberation attempt to distinguish 
deliberative interaction from other non-deliberative forms of action in 
which coercion, pressure, or strategic payoffs are the dominant force rather 
than reason-giving and persuasion on the basis of relevant considerations.8 
8 For the related practice of bargaining and its role in deliberative democracy, see e.g. 
Mansbridge et al. (2010) and Gutmann and Thompson (1996: 57–8, 69–75).
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Behind all these conceptions is the intuition that being pressured into 
doing something and being persuaded into it are different. Deliberation 
is about persuasion, not pressure. A full systemic theory of deliberation 
would require an elaborated defence of where to draw the line between 
pressure and persuasion, particularly in light of the standard for demo-
cratic deliberation that only the force of the better argument should pre-
vail. Although we do not do that here, we suggest the contours of such a 
defence.
Non-deliberative pressure comes in many forms. Two of the most diffi-
cult for deliberative theory involve money and protest. Both paying people 
to agree with you and disrupting normal activity until you get your way 
appear to violate the very core of deliberative persuasion. But money and 
protest can be effective political tools to advance important social and pol-
itical causes. A deliberative system approach allows us to step back and ask 
how this expenditure of money (e.g. in campaign advertisements) or that 
protest (e.g. an anti-immigrant demonstration or a Greenpeace action) 
enhances or detracts from the deliberative system.
To illustrate this approach, we will take a closer look at protest. Protest 
often appears to violate several standards of deliberation. When protest 
explicitly or implicitly threatens sanctions or imposes costs, it acts as a 
form of coercion.9 The slogans protestors use to excite enthusiasm and con-
vey a dramatic message also often undermine epistemic subtlety. Finally, 
protest sometimes involves levels of disruption and contestation that 
reduce mutual respect and full inclusion. A forum attempting to engage 
in the respectful mutual exchange of considerations for or against a pol-
icy may, for example, be disrupted by picketers, hecklers, and individ-
uals engaged in shouting down the speakers so that they cannot be heard 
(Estlund 2001). Could such apparently anti-deliberative behaviours ever 
enhance the deliberative system? From a systemic perspective, the answer 
sometimes will be yes. Protest contributes to the deliberative system most 
clearly as a remedial force introduced to correct or publicize a failure or 
weakness in fulfilling any or all of its key functions (Fung 2005). Protest 
can facilitate and promote the circulation of useful information; it can 
facilitate and promote ethically respectful interactions among citizens; 
9 For a definition of coercion as the threat of sanction or the use of force, see Mansbridge 
et al. (2010). However, note that in a systemic perspective what counts as coercion may 
depend on the relation of an individual act to the larger context in which it takes place. 
For example, a public relations campaign by a corporation to promote anti-union ‘right 
to work’ laws may seem or be non-coercive by itself, but may become coercive if it takes 
place in a context in which other people are engaging in intimidation of union members 
in other parts of the system. More generally, the normative force of a concept in one part 
of a system varies depending on what else in happening in other parts of a system.
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and it can begin to correct inequalities in access to influence by bringing 
more voices and interests into the decision-making processes.
For example, we could imagine using pressure to force the inclusion of 
marginalized voices or force new reasons, facts, and information into pub-
lic conversation. In such cases this pressure might make little, or even a 
negative, contribution to the ethical function of respectful mutual inter-
action. These cases pose trade-offs within the system. In any given actually 
existing political situation, levels of civility may have to go down in order 
for levels of inclusion to go up.10
Concretely, certain disruptive and only weakly civil Radical Left or 
Tea Party protests enhance the deliberative system if they can be reason-
ably understood as giving voice to a minority opinion long ignored in the 
public sphere, or as bringing more and better important information into 
the public arena. This is a big if. Figuring out the pros and cons for this 
and similar questions is a core undertaking of any deliberative system 
analysis.
A systemic analysis must be able to make these judgments and must 
have the analytic tools to do so. Without criteria to evaluate when non-
 deliberative, weakly deliberative, or even anti-deliberative behaviour 
nevertheless enhances the deliberative system, one risks falling into the 
blind spot of old style functionalism: everything can be seen as, in one 
way or another, contributing to the system. Thus a systemic analysis of 
Tea Party protests and disruptions, or of Greenpeace or labour action, 
requires a detailed analysis of the possible pluses and minuses with regard 
to the  deliberative system and a weighing of the results. In regard to cer-
tain Tea Party or Radical Left examples, we might in the end want to say 
that although these movements brought new voices into public debate, 
a move that is system enhancing, these benefits were outweighed by the 
partisan and aggressive tenor of many of the public protests and disrup-
tions, a context that creates a toxic atmosphere for deliberation and thus 
is not system enhancing over time. In this analysis much would depend 
on a combination of empirical and conceptual-analytic findings regarding 
the short-run and long-run inequalities redressed by the protesters and the 
short-run and long-run chilling effects of their actions upon deliberation.
Political media
Although the political media are a crucial part of the deliberative system in 
any modern democracy, they have not played a major role in much recent 
deliberative democracy theory. Many innovative deliberative initiatives 
10 Sanders (1997), Young (2000), Mansbridge et al. (2010).
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and institutions are designed to exclude or minimize the role of the media 
in deliberation. ‘Face-to-face’ means eliminating mediation. A theoretical 
focus on individual instances of deliberation that involve only face-to-face 
unmediated communication may implicitly or explicitly impugn the value 
of the media.
A systemic approach to deliberation sees the media as connecting many 
parts of the deliberative system. Few citizens in any country read the tran-
scripts of parliamentary and committee debates or even know what other 
citizens in other parts of the country are saying. Citizen knowledge of 
debates both in government and in the public sphere comes through the 
media, along with the framing and perspective-setting in which all media 
must, by their nature, engage.
The growing proliferation of different types of political media, perform-
ing different functions within the system, makes it hard to generalize about 
the systemic role of the media, let alone any particular form. One source 
may play different roles at different times or in regard to different issues. 
The many roles of the media appear in the different roles media profes-
sionals craft for themselves in addition to sellers of stories: vigilant watch-
dogs over power, representatives of citizens and communities, knowledge 
translators, educators of citizens, and public advocates, among others. A 
rich and sophisticated literature in media studies tracks and analyses the 
role of media in democracy. This literature, some of which already takes a 
relatively systemic approach, can serve as a general guide to the role of the 
media in a deliberative system. Our account, accordingly, will highlight 
only the epistemic, ethical, and democratic functions of the media in the 
deliberative system.
Epistemically, any democracy needs the political media to play the role 
of transmitter of reliable and useful information, to help citizens interpret 
facts and make connections between facts, roles, and policies, and to act as 
watchdogs, critics, and investigators. The epistemic function of the media is 
strengthened through self-policing as when, for example, one news source 
exposes the information failures of another. Yet the systemic incentives for 
media are well known to have their dysfunctional sides for the deliberative 
system. Efforts in ‘civic journalism’ to align these incentives more fully with 
citizen democratic needs have been only partially successful.
Partisan media are the lifeblood of any deliberative system designed 
along adversarial lines to advance the flow of information and insight 
through the marketplace of competition in ideas. Theorists from John 
Stuart Mill to Nancy Rosenblum have made an excellent case for such par-
tisanship.11 Recently, however, the increase in partisan reporting in the US 
11 Rosenblum (2010); also see Muirhead (2006).
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has provoked particular concern about the temptation in these media to 
falsify the facts and disseminate misinformation. Some partisan internet 
and even television commentators seem more than occasionally to have 
displayed a reckless disregard for the truth. A systemic approach does not 
imply that such reckless disregard enhances the overall deliberative sys-
tem. If a particular individual purveys outright falsehoods, that one indi-
vidual does not advance the epistemic goals of the deliberative system. But 
a systemic approach has to go beyond individuals and ask questions such 
as whether partisan reporting itself increases the likelihood of misinfor-
mation and fact bending. The partisan media may contain their own par-
tial corrective for this pathology, as the other side is always looking for 
the false move of its adversary. Misrepresentations and falsehoods survive 
even in the atmosphere of heightened scrutiny that often accompanies par-
tisan news battles.
Ethically, the news and other media greatly affect the tone of civility 
and respect among citizens. Certain kinds of partisan news commentary 
significantly raise the levels of incivility between citizens, as they did, 
for example, in the US in the 1900s (Schudson 1978). But it is not clear 
that partisanship in and of itself is uncivil or involves a lack of respect. 
Furthermore, at times (as noted in our discussion of protest) shrillness 
and disrespect may be warranted to raise awareness or get an issue on the 
agenda. Partisanship in itself is not in principle antithetical to the ethical 
function of the deliberative system.
Finally, the media play a significant role in democratic political inclu-
sion. The internet holds forth the promise of democratization, but its usage 
today tracks the usual class patterns (Schlozman et al. 2010). To the extent 
that citizens increasingly get their political information from the Internet, 
the ‘digital divide’ will continue to undermine the deliberative function of 
political inclusion. In addition, the tendency of the Internet and now the 
media in general to segregate audiences into like-minded ‘niches’ prevents 
citizens from hearing the other side and developing mutual respect for 
people with whom they disagree. As many have worried, these new tech-
nologies may facilitate niche or echo-chamber communication, in which 
the like-minded talk only with one another (Sunstein 2003).
We should think of any particular deliberative setting as embedded in 
a deliberative system held together in great part through the media. For 
example, the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on electoral reform was 
designed to function in some isolation from media coverage. Although it 
had staff responsible for communications during its process of learning 
and deliberation, it lacked a budget for communicating its recommenda-
tion to the broader public (Warren and Pearse 2008). Nevertheless, here, 
as in a similar Citizens’ Assembly in Ontario, the decisions reached in 
the assemblies were eventually put before the general public for debate 
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and then a referendum. Knowledge of what went on in the assembly, its 
mode of deliberation, its rationale, and the people who participated in it 
was communicated to the public primarily by the press (although the gov-
ernment provided brochures). In retrospect, the failure of the government 
to provide for any deliberative linkage between the minipublic and the 
broader public was a mistake: by default, it left responsibility for broader 
public deliberation to the media. There was a marked difference in the 
tone of the coverage in British Columbia, where the initiative won 58 per 
cent of the popular vote, and that in Ontario, where it received only 37 per 
cent. The British Columbia press was generally more favourable to very 
idea of a citizens assembly and spent more time (although still not much 
time) examining how the assembly worked and why it had been chosen to 
make the agenda-setting decision about the electoral system. The Ontario 
news media spent less time transmitting relevant information about the 
deliberation in this institution to the other parts of the deliberative sys-
tem. Was this a systemic failure? As Parkinson (Chapter 7) points out, the 
media have few incentives to focus on either the actual workings of any 
deliberative forum or the arguments and information transmitted therein. 
Their viewers are not sufficiently interested in these questions for them 
to be ‘news’ or even ‘human interest’. Yet the media, with their market 
incentives, serve as the major links to and among the citizenry within any 
deliberative system. This structure of incentives seems to point to a sys-
temic failure. A systemic approach contributes to this ongoing discussion 
by situating these questions in the context of the epistemic, ethical, and 
political functions of a deliberative system in a democracy.
Defects in the deliberative system
The ideal of a deliberative system, then, is a loosely coupled group of insti-
tutions and practices that together perform the three functions we have 
identified – seeking truth, establishing mutual respect, and generating 
inclusive, egalitarian decision-making. In this section, we describe five 
pathologies that keep political institutional arrangements from approach-
ing more closely the deliberative ideal in the system as whole: tight-
coupling; decoupling; institutional domination; social domination; and 
entrenched partisanship.
One virtue of a deliberative system is that failures in one institution 
can be compensated for in another part. When an expert community is 
too beholden to some conception of disease or risk, for example, citizen 
organizations or journalists can bring latent experiences and etiologies to 
their attention (Corburn 2005; Epstein 1996; Brown 1992). But when the 
parts of a deliberative system are too tightly coupled to one another, this 
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self-corrective quality is lost. Think of tight coupling as the problem of 
group-think writ large, at institutional scale.12 Perhaps the most familiar 
experiences of dramatic deliberative system failure from this pathology 
arise at the nation-state level when some public issue is driven by nation-
alism or xenophobia and those sentiments begin to drive individuals who 
inhabit all of the locations in a deliberative system. In the decision of the 
US Government to intern Japanese-Americans during World War II, for 
example, what we now believe to be the force of the better argument did 
not prevail because that argument could find no institutional point of pur-
chase in the deliberative system of that time and place.
A second defect in the deliberative system arises when the parts of the 
system become decoupled from one another in the sense that good reasons 
arising from one part fail to penetrate the others. Ideally, one would expect 
the large parts of a deliberative system to converge over time to accept good 
reasons, at least provisionally, even as each part is open to different con-
siderations in the process of converging. For example, many industrialized 
democracies now face difficult questions about how best to address their 
fiscal crises – whether to increase the tax burden, who should suffer that 
burden, and which public services and social welfare protections to reduce. 
Proposals and reasons for those proposals emanate from many parts of the 
deliberative system in these societies – from legislatures, expert commis-
sions, the executive branch, the courts, foundations, universities, public 
opinion, and even citizen deliberations specifically structured around this 
topic. In the ideal, through processes of convergence, mutual influence, 
and mutual adjustment, each of these parts would consider reasons and 
proposals generated in the other parts.
It may be the case, however, that some parts are particularly resistant to 
arguments from other parts. Experts, legislative committees, and citizens 
in the public sphere, for example, may listen to reasons more broadly, while 
legislators who have not worked on the issue respond primarily to paro-
chial interests – a constituency’s pet project or a mobilized but extreme 
minority opposed to increasing taxes no matter what the costs. Another 
example of deliberative decoupling is the resistance of some legislators and 
interest groups in the US to data from the scientific community on global 
warming.
Third, a deliberative system also fails when one of its parts, whether 
deliberative or not, dominates all of the others. This problem of institu-
tional domination (or in a weaker form, undue influence) appears most 
starkly in authoritarian societies where a state, party, or leader controls not 
12 See Janis (1982) for small group ‘group-think’.
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only the government but also the media and even civil-society organiza-
tions. Even in democratic systems, however, institutional domination can 
arise, as in Silvio Berlusconi’s corporate control of major mass media out-
lets when he was prime minister.
A fourth and related pathology of the deliberative system is social dom-
ination. It arises when a particular social interest or social class controls or 
exerts undue influence over many parts of the deliberative systems. Those 
who possess and control wealth, for example, exercise disproportionate 
influence in most, if not all, capitalist democracies. From the perspective 
of the deliberative system, this situation is especially problematic if the 
effect of wealth is to shift the balance of reasons for laws and policies at 
multiple sites in the deliberative system – through, for example, financial 
support for political campaigns, private ownership of concentrated media, 
financial backing that tilts the ecology of secondary associations and inter-
est groups (Walzer 2002), and even financing university-based research.
Finally, the deliberative system suffers when citizens, legislators, and 
administrators are so divided, by ideology, ethnicity, religion, or any other 
cleavage, that they will not listen to positions other than those eman-
ating from their side. We have made clear above that not every part of 
the deliberative system need itself be deliberative in this respect. Zealous 
advocacy, protest, and partisan journalism can all contribute to the quality 
and depth of deliberation in the system as a whole. These political activ-
ities enhance deliberation by offering new reasons or making it more likely 
that old reasons are considered in an equitable way. But reaping these ben-
efits requires an audience that itself possesses the deliberative disposition 
to weigh reasons and proposals. That audience might be citizens in the 
mass public, legislators, bureaucrats, or all three. Yet if these audiences are 
themselves zealously polarized or otherwise non-deliberative, the argu-
ments fall on deaf ears or reach only the already convinced. Acts of civil 
disobedience contribute to deliberation by causing an audience (e.g. the 
public in segregation-era America) to reconsider the justice of its positions 
(e.g. segregation).13 If that audience is unreceptive to reasons because it has 
already made up its mind or has decided not to think more about the ques-
tion, civil disobedience will not advance public deliberation.
Conclusion
From the beginning deliberative theory has had the ambition to provide 
a normative and empirical account of the democratic process as a whole. 
13 See discussion of civil disobedience in Rawls (1971); Dworkin (1985).
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The development of such an account has proceeded incrementally. Much 
of the work during the first phase focused on developing the ideal of delib-
eration – its meaning, justification, and responses to theoretical criticisms. 
Particularly important at this stage was laying out the idea of legitimacy at 
the core of deliberative democracy. Many theorists formulated the delib-
erative ideal on the foundational requirement that legitimate decisions be 
those that ‘everyone could accept’ or at least ‘not reasonably reject’. Above 
all, any conception of deliberative democracy must be organized around 
an ideal of political justification requiring free public reasoning of equal 
citizens (Cohen 1996; Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Habermas 1995). 
This phase emphasized what might be called ideal proceduralism as a 
‘regulative’ ideal (that is, one that recognizably cannot be achieved fully in 
practice but sets a standard at which to aim).
A second phase – a ‘coming of age’ – saw the proliferation of empir-
ical studies and practical applications of the theory (Bohman 1998). Ideal 
proceduralism had encouraged thinking of the standards for deliberative 
legitimacy through the image of an ideal deliberative forum. Thus in this 
second phase, many deliberative democrats started with this image as they 
tried to think about the ideal in concrete terms and seek approximations in 
the real world. Activists, theorists, and government officials collaborated 
on introducing into democratic politics many new varieties of delibera-
tive forums, including citizens juries, consensus councils, people’s parlia-
ments, citizens assemblies, and other relatively representative ‘minipublics’ 
designed to make possible deliberation within some approximation of a 
microcosm of the citizenry (see, e.g. Fung 2003). This practical and empir-
ical turn opened the door for empirical political scientists to study a var-
iety of settings in which deliberative democracy might work well or badly 
(Thompson 2008a). The empirical studies began to address issues such as 
the conditions that enable or constrain good deliberative processes.
As we have noted, however, most of these empirical studies addressed 
discrete instances of deliberation, investigated with little if any attention 
to their relationship to the system as a whole (Thompson 2008a). This 
limitation is understandable. The challenges of conducting research on 
discrete cases is formidable enough without attempting to relate the find-
ings to deliberation in other parts of the political system, let alone to non-
 deliberative practices in the system. Ultimately, however, none of these 
deliberative processes can be studied adequately in isolation, apart from 
their broader, systemic context. Legislative forums, deliberative minipub-
lics, and other communicative venues have unique and sometimes central 
roles in deliberative systems, but no single institution can meet all of the 
demands of deliberative democracy at once. It takes a study of deliberation 
beyond specific arenas, however important they may be, to understand 
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how each venue is influenced by interactions across the various parts of 
the deliberative system as a whole.
The literature has now reached a point that makes it possible and desir-
able to begin a third phase, and to try to make good on the original promise 
of a comprehensive account. Deliberative theory is ultimately concerned 
with the democratic process as a whole, and therefore with the relation-
ships of its parts to the whole. Deliberative democracy is more than a sum 
of deliberative moments.
We have proposed here a systemic approach that is intended to guide the 
progress in this third phase of work on deliberative democracy. We have 
shown how an analysis of deliberative functions – epistemic, ethical, and 
democratic, each contributing in different ways to the legitimacy of the 
system – can illuminate not only the more familiar and obviously delib-
erative practices in a system, but also the value or disvalue of non-deliber-
ative practices that have often been considered antithetical to deliberative 
democracy.
We have considered only a few of those practices as illustrations, and 
have not attempted at all to examine empirically the conditions under 
which they may promote or impede the goals of the deliberative system 
as a whole. Nor have we explored in detail the ways in which the various 
deliberative functions may interact with one another. But we have shown 
how the systemic approach can serve as a framework for a wide-ranging 
and fruitful normative and empirical study of the democratic process from 
a deliberative perspective.
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